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CURRENT AND FORMER PARTIES
The parties to the proceeding in this Court and their counsel are as follows:
1. Dale and Lana Burningham, represented by Brian C. Stewart of Siegfried &
Jensen, and George E. McLaughlin and Thomas R. Leeman of The Warshauer~

McLaughlin Law Group, P.C.
2. Wright Medical Technology, Inc. and Wright Medical Group, Inc., represented by
Elisabeth M. McOmber of Snell & Wilmer, and Dana J. Ash, Robert M.
Palumbos, Sean K. Burke, and Ryan J. O'Neil of Duane Morris LLP.

The fomer parties to the underlying district court action, Bruningham v. Wright
Med. Tech., Inc., Case No. 2: 17-cv-00092-JNP, who are not parties to the proceeding in
this Court are as follows:
1. Harlan C. Amstuz, M.D., a California corporation; and
2. Harlan C. Amstuz, M.D., an individual.
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INTRODUCTION

Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a nonprofit, public-interest law firm and
policy center with supporters in all 50 states, including Utah. WLF promotes free
enterprise, individual rights, limited government, and the rule oflaw. To that end, WLF
has appeared before both state and federal courts throughout the county to oppose the
unwarranted expansion of tort liability that fosters excessive litigation and impedes
development of new medical products. See, e.g., McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 170519, 2018 WL 2186550 (W. Va. May 11, 2018); Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372
S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2012).
WLF supports a balanced approach to products-liability rules that takes into
account both the interests of consumers in adequate compensation for injuries caused by
defective products and society's interest in the continued availability of products that
provide significant health benefits yet are unavoidably unsafe. WLF is concerned that a
decision not to apply Comment k to implanted medical devices, or to do so only on a
case-by-case basis, would allow juries to question the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA) judgment about safety and effectiveness. The reasoning the Utah Supreme Court
employed when recognizing Comment k's application to prescription drugs applies
equally to implanted medical devices and can provide transparency and produce
consistent results in court.
WLF has no direct interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of this litigation.
Lacking any direct interest, WLF can provide the Court with a perspective distinct from
that of any party.
1
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Judge Jill N. Parrish of the United States District Court for the District of Utah
certified the following questions of law to this Court:
1. Under Utah law, does the unavoidably unsafe exception to strict products liability
Gj

in design defect claims recognized in Comment k to Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts apply to implanted medical devices?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, does the exception apply
categorically to all implanted medical devices, or does the exception apply only to
some devices on a case-by-case basis?
3. If the exception applies on a case-by-case basis, what is the proper analysis to
determine whether the exception applies?
4. If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, does the exception require a
showing that such devices were cleared for market through the FDA's premarket
approval process as opposed to the § 51 O(k) clearance process?
Certification Order at 8 (February 15, 2018).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Dale and Lana Burningham brought this suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, alleging three causes of action, including a strict liability
design defect claim, against the manufacturer of medical devices implanted in both of
Dale Burningham' s ("Burningham") hips. Defendants (collectively, "Wright Medical")
filed a motion to dismiss the strict design defect liability claim for failure to state a claim.
Wright Medical argued the hip implants are "unavoidably unsafe" products and are
2
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therefore categorically barred from strict liability design defect claims under the
exception to strict products liability set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The district court certified to the Utah Supreme Court the
questions as outlined above. On April 2, 2018, this Court accepted the District Court's
Certification of Questions of State Law. Order of Acceptance at 1-2 (April 2, 2018).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The unavoidably unsafe exception to strict products liability in design defect
claims recognized in Comment k should apply categorically to all implanted medical
devices. This Court adopted Comment k's policy as the law to be applied categorically to
prescription drugs in Utah in 1991. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah
1991 ). Due to their unique characteristics, prescription drugs potentially affect each
patient differently, and it is impossible to design a drug in a manner that will render it
safe for all individuals. Because of this, manufacturers of prescription drugs are not
strictly liable for injuries caused by these drugs, as it is impossible to design a product
that provides the desired benefits while also remaining completely safe. Much the same
way, implanted medical devices are unavoidably unsafe, as each device has the potential
to injure certain patients based on the particular characteristics of a given individual.

Hufft v. Horowitz, 4 Cal. App. 4th 8, 18 (1992).
Comment k will not eliminate all avenues of recovery for injured consumers. It
only exempts manufacturers of implanted devices from strict products liability suits for
design defects. Plaintiffs may still bring negligence claims or sue for manufacturing

3
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ij)

defects or failure-to-warn, leaving open the ability to recover for injuries while providing
some protection and clarity to manufacturers.
Public policy also favors applying Comment k categorically to implanted medical
devices. Under a case-by-case approach, each case devolves into a mini-trial, allowing
plaintiffs to maneuver cases to the jury, where lay jurors decide whether the benefits of a
prescription drug or device outweigh the potential risks. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 94-95.
Gj

This leaves manufacturers unsure of which products they produce could potentially be
deemed defectively designed. In many instances, manufacturers could respond by
ceasing to produce devices or raising the cost and passing it on to consumers due to lost
profits from lawsuits. Id. at 94. There is a strong public interest in favor of providing
more affordable life-altering products to consumers rather than holding manufacturers to
be strict insurers of their products. Id. at 99.
Allowing juries to decide the fate of implanted medical devices ignores the FDA
approval processes. FDA analyzes implanted medical devices through the premarket
approval process (PMA) or§ 510(k) clearance process. FDA experts conduct a thorough
risk-benefit analysis before allowing implanted medical devices to go to market. After a

~

device is sold, doctors, who know every detail about their patients' health and individual
characteristics, conduct another risk-benefit analysis to determine which device is best
suitable for that particular patient, thereby further reducing the likelihood that an
unavoidably unsafe implanted medical device will actually injure a patient.
The transparency and clarity of a categorical approach benefits manufacturers and
consumers alike, and avoids allowing a jury to make cost-benefit determinations.
4
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ARGUMENT

I.

UNDER UTAH LAW, THE COMMENT K UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE EXCEPTION
TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN DESIGN DEFECT CLAIMS SHOULD
APPLY CATEGORICALLY TO ALL IMPLANTED MEDICAL DEVICES

This Court, as it did in Grundberg, should adopt Comment k as applied
categorically to medical devices. Implanted medical devices provide important benefits
to consumers, yet can interact with each patient differently, making them unavoidably
unsafe. The characteristics of such devices, combined with FDA oversight and the fact
that doctors must prescribe them to patients before they are implanted, makes courts the
wrong place to conduct risk-benefit analyses. This rationale has been recognized by
court decisions from jurisdictions around the country and should apply equally in Utah.
A. Utah Applied the Comment k Exception to Prescription Drugs in
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.

Section 402A of the Restatement imposes strict liability on anyone "who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, or to
his property" regardless whether the seller "exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product." Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A (1965). Comment k,
however, creates an exception to strict liability for "unavoidably unsafe" products.
Comment k reads, in part,
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs .... Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous .... The seller of such products, again with
the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given .. .is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to
5
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~

supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A comment k (1965). There are some products that
pose dangers even when used entirely as intended, but there is a strong public interest in
making such products available, so manufacturers are not held to be strict insurers of
those products. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92.
In 1991, this Court in Grundberg addressed the issue of whether Comment k
applies in the context of prescription drugs. Id. at 91. In addressing the question, the
Court explained that the purpose of Comment k is to "protect from strict liability products
that cannot be designed more safely." Id. at 92. Products are deemed unavoidably unsafe
if they "provide an exceptionally important benefit" yet pose a "substantial and
unavoidable" risk to their users. Id. at 93. The Court analyzed whether prescription
drugs fall into this category of products, and then considered whether Comment k should
apply on a case-by-case basis or categorically to all prescription drugs. Id. at 93.
The Court discussed the unique characteristics of prescription drugs, noting that
they can and do pose different risks to different people. Id. at 95. Prescription drugs fall
into the category of products that can be dangerous in some circumstances even when
used as intended. Id. It is difficult, if not impossible, to design a prescription drug that
will achieve the goal of curing ailments while also causing no side effects for anyone. Id.
Because of this, the Court held that Comment k's immunity from strict liability applies to
prescription drugs. Id. In so holding, the Court aligned Utah with the vast majority of

6
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states that recognize Comment k as applying to prescription drugs, thereby exempting
manufacturers from strict design defect liability for injuries caused by the drugs.
The Court went a step further, holding that Comment k applies categorically to all
prescription drugs. Id. at 95. The Court stated, "[W]e are troubled by the lack of
uniformity and certainty inherent in the case-by-case approach and fear the resulting
disincentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop new products." Id. at 94-95. A
case-by-case approach to these cases leads to "mini-trials" that have a "negative impact
on the development and marketing of new drugs." Id. at 94 (citing Brown v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1067-68 (1988)). Grundberg worried that adopting a case-by-

case approach could "lead to disparate treatment of the same drug by different judges"
and if a judge believed that "reasonable minds could differ on the question," a lay jury
would decide whether a drug's benefits outweigh its inherent risks. Id. at 94. In fact, it is
likely that this approach would not only cause confusion, but would make it more
difficult for a defendant to establish Comment k immunity than to rebut a plaintiffs case
of design defect under the strict liability standard. Id. at 95 (citing Reilly, The Erosion of
Comment k, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV. 255,266 (1989)). Manufacturers would be subject to

more litigation under a case-by-case regime, and allowing juries to make these decisions
can lead to inconsistent results. Id. at 94. This approach also essentially ignores FDA's
regulatory process, with courts second-guessing decisions already made by the FDA. Id.
at 95.

7
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B. Grundberg's Rationale Is Fully Applicable to Implanted Medical Devices
Implanted medical devices are extremely important (in terms of saving lives or
reducing pain and suffering), go through extensive FDA review, yet inevitably lead to
widely disparate outcomes based on the individual physical characteristics of each
~

patient. Thus, the rationale from Grundberg should equally apply to implanted medical
devices.
Like prescription drugs, implanted medical devices can be dangerous and harm
certain individuals even when doctors follow all proper protocol in treating the patient.
Implanted medical devices are available only through a doctor's prescription. Indeed,

~

implanting a device physically in a patient by definition entails a doctor's assistance.
Hufft, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 18. Devices "can save lives or reduce pain and suffering. Such

products are commonly crucial to the well-being of the patient. Some devices are so
important that, as is the case with prescription drugs, the patient faces death without
them." Id.; see also Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to
FDA Regulation ofMedical Devices, 88 Geo. L.J. 2119, 2127 (2000) ("Both devices and

drugs ... have the potential to provide substantial social benefits."). In other cases, as with
hip implants, they are vital to reducing pain and suffering and can immensely improve
the quality of a patient's life. Also similar to prescription drugs, implanted medical
devices "become an integrated part of the person" and pose unavoidable risk of harm to
some patients dependent on the "peculiar physical characteristics of the individual."
Hufft, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 18.

8
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Both prescription drugs and implanted medical devices are unavoidably unsafe.

Grundberg found, "Despite inherent risks, and in contrast to any other product, society
has determined that prescription medications provide a unique benefit and so should be
available to physicians with appropriate warnings and guidance as to use." Grundberg,
813 P.2d at 96. Likewise, implanted medical devices "are available only through a
physician and can save lives or reduce pain and suffering." Hufft, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 18.
Also like prescription drugs, "the result [of an implanted medical device] may be

~

dependent upon the peculiar characteristics of the individual." Id. Even when a
manufacturer seeks to market an implanted medical device by obtaining § 51 O(k)
clearance, FDA still requires manufacturers to demonstrate that a device is at least as safe
and effective as a device already on the market, the FDA determines that the benefits of
implanted medical devices provide outweigh the potential risks imposed by such devices.
21 C.F.R. 807.92.
In Utah, Comment k should apply categorically to all implanted medical devices,
because (as Grundberg explained) a case-by-case approach potentially could lead to even
more confusion than maintaining strict liability. Manufacturers should have the ability to
develop and produce medical devices without being strictly liable for unavoidable
consequences.

C. Decisions From Other States Have Cogently Explained Why Comment K
Applies Categorically to Implanted Medical Devices
The vast majority of states apply Comment k in some fashion to medical devices,
relying on their reasoning for applying it to prescription drugs. And well-reasoned

9
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decisions from across the nation support extending Comment k categorically to implanted
medical devices. 1 These decisions explain why the rationale articulated in Grundberg
applies fully to implanted medical devices.
Indeed, the only state legislature that has enacted legislation expressly applying
~

Comment k to medical devices have done so categorically. In Ohio, the legislature
enacted a law declaring that "an ethical drug or ethical medical device is not defective in
design or formulation because some aspect of it is unavoidably unsafe, if the
manufacturer of the ethical drug or ethical medical device provides adequate warning and
instruction." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.75(D) (West 2018).
Many courts have arrived at the same conclusion. The Washington Supreme Court
held that medical devices were unavoidably unsafe, relying on comment k and the
learned intermediary doctrine. Terhune v. A.H. Robbins Co., 90 Wn.2d 9 (1978). The
court found the unavoidably unsafe exception was based "in the character of the medical
profession and the relationship which exists between the manufacturer, the physician, and
the patient." Id. at 16.
Several state appellate courts decisions provide particularly insightful reasoning

~

regarding the application of Comment k to implanted medical devices. Indeed, their
approach is similar to that of the Utah Supreme Court in Grundberg.

1

Among the well-reasoned state court decisions that have applied Comment k
categorically to medical devices are Terhune v. A.H Robbins Co., 90 Wn.2d 9 (1978)
(pre-Medical Device Amendments case applying Comment k to medical device); Hufft v.
Horowitz, 4 Cal. App. 4th 8 (1992); and Creazzo v. Medtronic, Inc., 903 A.2d 24 (Pa.
Super. 2006).
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In California, courts adopt a clear categorical approach to Comment k. Beginning
with Brown (which Grundberg followed when adopting Comment k), California first

~

applied Comment k across the board to prescription drugs. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1061.
Since then, it expanded this approach to medical devices. See Hufft, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 11
(applying Comment k to "all implanted medical devices"). In Hufft, the court held that
implanted medical devices "are available only through a physician and can save lives or
reduce pain and suffering" and can be "so important that, as is the case with prescription
drugs, the patient faces death without them." Id. at 18. The surgical implantation and
removal of implanted medical devices poses a risk of harm akin to prescription drugs,
and each patient could react differently when exposed to the device. Because of this, it is
impossible to make these devices completely safe for every patient. Id. While there are
certain inherent risks involved, the court held, "the public's interest in development,
availability and affordability of medical devices demands rejection of strict liability and
adoption of the Comment k standard." Id. at 19.
The court held, citing Brown, that Comment k provides a negligence standard of
liability for alleged design defects, and conducting a case-by-case risk/benefit analysis of
each implanted medical device would diminish the benefit of that standard. Id. at 19
(citing Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069, fn. 11). Therefore, the court concluded, Comment k
applies categorically to all implanted medical devices. Id. at 19. California holds that
strict liability for design defects is never available as a matter of law. Artiglio v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1397 (1994) (holding that medical implants available only
through the services of a physician are immune from design defect strict liability).

11
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Pennsylvania state courts have similarly concluded that the reasons for applying
Comment k to prescription drugs also apply to medical devices. See Creazzo v.
Medtronic, Inc., 903 A.2d 24 (Pa. Super. 2006). In Pennsylvania, both the Superior
Court and the Supreme Court held that Comment k precludes strict design defect liability
for prescription drugs based on the policies directly expressed in Comment k. Hahn v.
Richter, 543 Pa. 558, 560-63 (1996). The Superior Court determined that Comment k
excludes prescription drugs from strict liability claims because prescription drugs are
"inherently dangerous products which benefit society." Hahn v. Richter, 427 Pa. Super.
130, 151 (1993) aff'd, 543 Pa. 558 (1996).
In Creazzo, the Superior Court expanded Comment k's reach to implanted medical
devices on a categorical basis. It agreed with the trial court's finding that, given the
utility and unavoidably unsafe nature of implanted medical devices, there was no
significant difference between such devices and prescription drugs from the Hahn
decision. Creazzo, 903 A.2d at 31. Based on those considerations, the court concluded
that there is "no reason why the same rational[ e] applicable to prescription drugs may not
be applied to medical devices." Id.
Federal courts, when called upon to interpret state law, have ruled similarly. They
have relied on the policy arguments embraced in prescription drug cases to apply
Comment k to medical devices.2 The Fourth Circuit determined that, under South

2

Several federal courts have interpreted state laws as finding medical devices to be
unavoidably unsafe similar to prescription drugs. See, e.g., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc.,
750 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying South Carolina law, determining
"certain products, particularly ethical drugs and medical devices ... are deemed
12
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Carolina law, an implanted medical device qualified as unavoidably unsafe under
Comment k. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984). Basing its
reasoning on the plain language of Comment k, the court stated, "Certain products,
particularly ethical drugs and medical devices, often cause unwanted side effects despite
(iJ

the fact that they have been carefully designed and properly manufactured .... Such
products are deemed 'unavoidably unsafe,' but are not defective or unreasonably
dangerous if they are marketed with proper directions for use or include adequate
warnings of potential side effects." Id. at 1230-31.
A federal district court, applying Pennsylvania law, provides helpful guidance for
why Comment k should apply to medical devices to the same extent that it applies to
prescription drugs. Souffias v. Zimmer, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Pa. 2007). In
Souffias, the court determined that Comment k applies across-the-board to implanted

medical devices based on the reasoning from Creazzo and prescription drug cases like
Hahn. Id. at 750 (citing Creazzo, 903 A.2d at 24, and other federal district courts that

have held the same).
As the decisions of state and federal courts around the country demonstrate, the
rationale for exempting prescription drugs from strict liability suits equally applies to

'unavoidably unsafe"'); Rodriguez v. Stryker Corp, 680 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2012)
(applying Tennessee law, invoking comment kin case involving pain pump); Phelps v.
Sherwood Medical Industries, 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Indiana law,
finding "no principled basis" for distinction between prescription drugs and medical
devices like heart catheter at issue); Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., 724
F.2d 613, 621 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Iowa law, applying comment k broadly to
include tampons); Adams v. Synthes Spine, 298 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying
Washington law).
13
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implanted medical devices. Prescription drugs and implanted medical devices have the
potential to provide life-saving treatment for patients, and to reduce pain and suffering.
Because FDA (as well as the prescribing physician) have determined that the inherent
risks involved do not outweigh those benefits, juries are not the proper parties to decide
Gi)

that the products are subject to strict liability defective design claims. As such, the Utah
Supreme Court should categorically extend Comment k to implanted medical devices
II.

Gi

MANUFACTURERS OF IMPLANTED MEDICAL DEVICES SHOULD BE
EXEMPTED FROM STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS FOR DESIGN
DEFECTS WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER THE PRODUCT WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY PROPER WARNINGS AND MANUFACTURED WITHOUT
FAULT

Comment k only considers strict design defect liability, therefore leaving open the
possibility for plaintiffs to bring other claims against manufacturers for injuries they
suffer as a result of an implanted medical device, including other types of strict liability
claims. Comment k does not foreclose plaintiffs from recovering for injuries. Plaintiffs
in these cases often argue, however, that a manufacturer is only exempted from strict
design defect liability if it can prove it also provided adequate warnings and
manufactured the device properly. That argument is based on a misreading of Comment
k; if a device is deemed unavoidably unsafe, a manufacturer can never be strictly liable
for design defects.
Grundberg makes clear that Comment k focuses solely on design-defect

allegations. That is, while the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe product may not be
sued under Section 402A for an alleged defect in product design, it may still be sued for
either of the other two types of product defects identified by Grundberg: manufacturing
14
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flaws and inadequate warnings regarding use. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92 (citing Prosser
& Keeton, The Law of Torts§ 99, at 695-98 (5th ed. 1984)). According to the Utah
Supreme Court,
By its terms, Comment k excepts unavoidably unsafe products from strict
liability only to the extent that the plaintiff alleges a design defect;
Comment k's immunity from strict liability does not extend to strict
liability claims based on manufacturing flaw or an inadequate warning. The
purpose of Comment k is to protect from strict liability products that cannot
be designed more safely.

Grundberg, 813 P .2d at 92 (emphasis added). The manufacturer's immunity from strict
liability for design defects is not dependent on a showing that the product contains no
manufacturing flaws and is accompanied by adequate warnings. If the plaintiff claims
that the product was defectively manufactured or inadequately labeled, it may file
separate causes of actions asserting those claims. But such assertions do not serve to
defeat the manufacturer's Comment k defense to a design-defect strict products liability
claim.
Assertions to the contrary are based on the fifth sentence of Comment k, which
states that an unavoidably unsafe product, "properly prepared and accompanied by proper
directions and warning is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A Comment k (1965); see, e.g. Brief of Appellee at 45, In re:

Wright Medical Technology, Inc., Conserve Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation,
No. 16-12162 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2016) (arguing evidence of proper manufacture and
adequate warnings are prerequisites to the Comment k defense). Read in context, that
sentence does not impose a limitation on Comment k defenses. Rather, the sentence in
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question states that all Section 402A strict liability claims against an unavoidably unsafe
product are foreclosed if the product is properly prepared and accompanied by proper
directions and warnings. That is, the plaintiff may not assert any one of the three types of
Section 402A claims against the product manufacturer. On the other hand, if the product
was not properly prepared, then the plaintiff may assert a manufacturing-flaw claim
(based both on Section 402A and negligence); and may assert similar failure-to-warn
claims if the product is not accompanied by proper directions and warning. But the fifth
sentence does not serve as a prerequisite to a manufacturer relying on the unavoidablyunsafe defense of Comment k. A contrary ruling would create "mini-trials" in each case,
requiring defendants to rebut all claims in order to survive a design defect claim.
Courts have uniformly rejected this crabbed interpretation of Comment k. In
California, courts have rejected the need to address manufacturing defects and adequate
warnings when ruling on the question of design defect liability. See, e.g., Artiglio, 22
Cal. App. 4th at 1393. The plaintiffs in Artiglio argued "that a condition to avoidance of
strict liability is that the product has been marketed with adequate warnings of its
potential risks." Id. (citing Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1061). The court disagreed, holding
that, while pre-Brown decisions may have conflated the three theories of liability, it is
now clear that each is distinguishable. The court, in rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments,
noted that the Brown court reached "the question of strict liability based solely on design
defect" and was not required to, nor did it, address whether there were manufacturing
defects or a failure to warn. The court noted, however, that while Comment k exempts
manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products from strict design defect liability claims,
16
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patients are not deprived of all recourse. Manufacturers remain liable for manufacturing
defects or a failure to provide adequate warnings. Id.
Other courts applying California law bolster this conclusion, observing that the
Artiglio court clearly rejected the argument that a device manufacturer can only avoid

strict liability if it provides adequate warnings. Sukonik v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 2015
WL 10682986, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2015). Rather, as the court correctly held,
Comment k means that liability for defective design simply cannot be "premised on strict
liability." Plaintiffs may bring negligence suits for design defect and strict liability suits
for manufacturing defects and failure-to-warn, but a strict products design defect liability
claim does not lie against an unavoidably unsafe product regardless whether it provided
adequate warning or was manufactured without fault. See, e.g., Rhynes v. Stryker
Corp., No. 10-5619 S.C. 2011 WL 2149095, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) ("Properly

read ... [Comment k] means that a manufacturer of prescription medical devices can be
held strictly liable only for manufacturing defects or inadequate warnings-it may not be
held strictly liable for design defects .... California law categorically protects
manufacturers of prescription medical devices from strict liability for design defects.").
Several other courts around the country have reached the same conclusion,
distinguishing design defect claims from manufacturing defect and failure-to-warn
claims. Courts applying Pennsylvania law, for example, interpreted Hahn to mean that
strict liability claims are barred in prescription medical device cases. Killen v. Stryker
Spine, 2012 WL 4498865, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2012) (citing Hahn, 427 Pa. Super. at

152). Pennsylvania finds that permitting design defect claims to proceed only under a
17
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negligence theory provides a high degree of consumer protection while also making sure
a manufacturer is not strictly liable for all possible consequences. See Hahn, 427 Pa.
Super. at 152.
The assertion that adequate warnings and no-fault manufacturing are a prerequisite
Gj

to the Comment k defense is also inconsistent with the manner in which Grundberg
addressed the products liability claims asserted in that case. In Grundberg, the plaintiffs
brought a design defect claim as well as a failure-to-warn claim. The court permitted the
plaintiffs' suit to go forward in federal court with respect to the failure-to-warn claims
even as the Court held that the plaintiffs' strict liability design-defect claims were barred
by Comment k. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90. If the Court had really interpreted the
Comment k unavoidably-unsafe design-defect defense as inapplicable if proper directions
~

and warning did not accompany the product, then it would not have found Comment k
applicable to Grundberg' s claims.
Design defect refers to the product's characteristics (as approved by FDA),
whereas inadequate warnings and manufacturing defects refer to the manner in which the
product is introduced to consumers. Once it is determined that Comment k covers
implanted medical devices, strict products liability for design defects is precluded. See

Parks v. Danek Medical, Inc., 1999 WL 1129706, at *6 (N.D. Ind. June 17, 1999) ("The
legal effect of finding a product to be 'unavoidably unsafe' under Comment k is that a
plaintiff may recover based on improper or negligent preparation or inadequate warning,
but not on the basis that the design of the product was defective.").
~
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III.

A RULING THAT COMMENT K IS INAPPLICABLE TO IMPLANTED MEDICAL
DEVICES WOULD DETER INNOVATION AND DEPRIVE CONSUMERS OF
INVALUABLE MEDICAL PRODUCTS

Borrowing from Brown, Grundberg noted several public policy reasons for
applying Comment k to prescription drugs. Those policy reasons are equally applicable
ti

to implanted medical devices.
Among the policy reasons cited by the Court mitigating against imposing strict
liability on manufacturers of prescription drugs were: ( 1) that drug manufacturers would
stop producing valuable drugs due to lost profits resulting from lawsuits; (2) that
consumers had a vested interest in the prompt marketing of newly discovered medical
products, yet increased liability risks might cause manufacturers to delay product
launches; and (3) that the added cost of insuring against strict liability suits for design
defects would lead drug manufacturers to raise prices and pass those prices on to
consumers, rendering the products unaffordable to some patients. Grundberg, 813 P.2d
at 94 (citing Brown 44 Cal. 3d at 1064-65). Without prescription drugs to cure ailments,
"the general standard of living in this country ... would be seriously impaired." Id. at 96
(internal citation omitted). Each of these policies applies equally to implanted medical
devices.
Prescription drugs, according to the Court, "have dangers associated with their use
even though they are used as intended." Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92. Comment k exempts
prescription drugs from strict liability suits because of the "public interest in the
development, availability, and reasonable price of drugs." Id. at 94 (citing Brown, 44 Cal.
3d at 1061 ). This logic also should apply to implanted medical devices.
19
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Ci
The California court in Hufft held that implanted medical devices should be placed
in the same category as prescription drugs for the same policy reasons. 4 Cal. App. 4th at
18. In Hufft, the court had to determine whether the reasoning of Brown, which held that
Comment k categorically exempts manufacturers of prescription drugs from strict
liability for design defects, also applies to implanted prescription medical devices. The
court found that "the compelling public policy reasons articulated by the Brown court
with regard to prescription drugs apply with equal force when the product is an implanted
medical device." Id. at 11. Though implanted medical devices can work entirely as
intended but still pose unavoidable dangers to the patients, there is a great public interest
~

in continuing to develop life-saving medical devices that are widely available and
affordable. Id. at 18. "Society is well served by restricting available avenues of
monetary recovery in exchange for increasing availability of life-saving, sufferingalleviating products. That policy applies to medical devices and prescription drugs
alike." Id. at 19.
Just as it applied Comment k to prescription drugs in Grundberg, this Court should
extend Comment k to implanted medical devices categorically. A case-by-case approach
is counter to the public interest, leading to mini-trials and inconsistent results.
Manufacturers' focus should be on developing medical products that will best improve
the quality of patients' lives, not on worrying about the possibility that a court or jury will
determine that their product does not fall under the Comment k exception. Grundberg,
813 P.2d at 95.
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IV.

THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE PROVIDES ADEQUATE
PROTECTION FOR CONSUMERS, AS DEVICES CANNOT ENTER THE MARKET
ABSENT SOME FORM OF FDA APPROVAL, AND DOCTORS MUST PRESCRIBE
IMPLANTED DEVICES TO PATIENTS

In addition to acknowledging the public interest in the availability and
affordability of prescription drugs in Grundberg, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the
role of FDA in approving prescription drugs, noting the extensive screening process
ensures the benefits of prescription drugs outweigh the risks. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 96.
Prescription drugs in particular are subject to years of testing and review by experts as
well as postmarket surveillance to flag any potential issues that arise after the drug is on
the market. Id. at 96-97. Comment k should and does provide a broad exemption for
prescription products because they are not generally available to the public and require a
doctor's prescription.

See Michael Napoli, Jane Backus and Sandra Zamora, Medical

Devices and Comment k: A Defense Worth Fighting For, Rx for the Defense, DRI

Newsletter (July 24, 2014), available at https://www.dykema.com/media/site_files/
106_ DRI%20--%20Comment%20K%20Article_5301700_ 2.doc. Implanted medical
devices are similarly unavailable unless: (1) the FDA has approved marketing; and (2) a
doctor has prescribed the medical product.
Grundberg held that Comment k applies categorically to prescription drugs based

in large part on "the effectiveness of the FDA's regulatory process." Grundberg, 813
P.2d at 95. The Court found FDA's "extensive regulatory scheme capable of and
appropriate for making the preliminary determination regarding whether a prescription
drug's benefits outweigh its risks." Id. at 97. Combined with FDA's postmarket
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surveillance of the drugs, the Court found it inappropriate to allow individual courts and
juries to also "continually reevaluate a drug's risks and benefits. Id. To leave the
question of whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe up to the jury would ignore FDA's
processes.
Similarly, FDA is closely involved in the approval process of medical devices. To
enter the market, FDA approves implanted medical devices in one of several ways. 3 One
is the Premarket Approval (PMA), the most stringent application that requires FDA to
determine whether the PMA contains sufficient valid scientific evidence that provides
reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. See Device Approvals,

Denials, and Clearances, U.S. Food & Drug Administration (last updated Mar. 26,
2018), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures
/deviceapprovalsandclearances/default.htm. Many implanted medical devices are
marketed only after completing the PMA approval process.
Additionally, manufacturers may obtain FDA marketing clearance by submitting a
51 0(k) application. Id. Here, manufacturers notify FDA of their intent to market a new
3

Federal law establishes various levels of oversight for medical devices depending on the
risks they present. Devices are separated into three classes, with Class I devices
receiving the lowest level of oversight and Class III devices presenting the greatest risks
to health and life and therefore receiving the highest level of oversight. See generally,
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316-17 (2008). Implanted devices are at the high
end of FDA oversight; all are classified as either Class III devices or prescription Class II
devices. WLF does not contend that simple Class I devices (e.g., tongue depressors) are
unavoidably unsafe or that they should qualify for Comment k exemption from strict
products liability. But for all the reasons cited in Grundberg, implanted medical devices
so qualify. Implanted devices-whose implantation into the human body generally
requires invasive surgery-entail health risks that vary substantially and in unknown
ways from patient to patient, yet at the same time they play a major role in saving lives
and reducing pain and suffering.
22
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Ii
medical device, and FDA determines whether the device is substantially equivalent to a
device already on the market. See 501 (k) Clearances, U.S. Food & Drug Administration
(last updated Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Productsand
MedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/51 0kClearances/default.htm. While
~

the Section 51 0(k) clearance process imposes a somewhat reduced product-approval
standard on manufacturers, it is nonetheless true that no device reaches the market via
this process without first undergoing extensive FDA review.
FDA's review of a 510(k) application provides adequate protection for consumers
before a device enters the market. FDA looks to whether a device is substantially
equivalent to other legally marketed devices. It analyzes the intended use of the product,
its technological characteristics, and determines whether the device is "at least as safe and
effective as the legally marketed device." Premarket Notification 51 O(k), U.S. Food &
Drug Administration (last updated Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/premarketsubmissions/premarketn
otification51 0k/default.htm. Once a device is on the market, device manufacturers are
subject to postmarket requirements and surveillance, like with prescription drugs.

Postmarket Requirements (Devices), U.S. Food & Drug Administration (last updated
Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance
/postmarketrequirements/default.htm. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has directly
warned against the dangers of permitting state courts to second-guess the process by
which FDA clears a medical device for Section 51 0(k) marketing, holding that (in many
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instances) such products liability claims are preempted by federal law. See Buckman Co.

v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
Not only does FDA provide effective risk-benefit assessments, but doctors also
add a layer of protection. It is the doctor's job to understand each individual patient and
prescribe devices based on the patient's unique requirements. The doctor essentially
conducts another risk-benefit analysis, deciding which of the available medical devices, if
any, can best help a patient. While not at issue in this case, the "learned intermediary
rule" provides insight into how doctors protect patients. Under this rule, a manufacturer
satisfies its obligation to warn about the risks of medical products by providing such
warnings to the patient's doctor. See Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79
P.3d 922, 928 (Utah 2003). The doctor is a learned intermediary, who receives warnings,
instructions, and guidance from the manufacturer before prescribing a device for a
patient. Id. The doctor, as the one treating a patient, is in the best position to weigh the
potential dangers of implanted medical devices, and ensure, to the greatest extent

"

possible, that a patient does not receive a device that will pose unnecessary risks. Id. at
928-29.
Patients are protected both by FDA and their doctors who conduct risk-benefit
analyses prior to approving medical devices and later implanting them. Despite these
protections, some devices still are unavoidably unsafe and can injure patients even when
all necessary precautions are taken. Hufft, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 18. The policy behind
Comment k and exempting implanted medical devices from strict product design defect
liability suits is to encourage innovation in a field where human lives are at stake. It
24
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makes no sense, then, to "impose absolute or strict liability where, in spite of the best of
intentions, learning and study, a [device] did not fulfill the goal." Victor E. Schwartz,

Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment k, 42
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1139, 1143 (1985). FDA review and doctors' knowledge of their
patients protect them from potential risks and helps ensure that the benefits of a device
outweigh those risks. These protections should allow manufacturers to innovate in the
implanted medical device field without fear that they will be exposed to strict liability
should unavoidable injuries may occur.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this brief, Washington Legal Foundation respectfully
request the court determine that Comment k applies categorically to implanted medical
devices.
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